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William Sampson and the Codifiers: The
Roots of American Legal Reform, 1820-1830
by MAxwELL BLOOMFIELD*
'HERE IS NOTHING MORE COMMON than to confound the terms
Tof
the American Revolution with those of the late American
war," wrote Benjamin Rush in 1787. "The American war is over,
but this is far from being the case with the American revolution.
On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama is
closed."'
The transition from colony to nation involved difficult readjustments in the thinking and behavioral patterns of the American
people, and nowhere were the inherent tensions more evident than
in the field of law. Prior to the revolution, Americans had willingly accepted the legal principles and practices of the mother country, although modifying them somewhat to suit the more fluid
social and economic environment of the New World. But the achievement of political independence from England soon led to demands
that all other ties with the former metropolis be severed as well.
Radical agitators in various states thus urged the complete
abandonment of the common law during the years from 1783 to
1815. Generally their attacks were motivated by political considerations, becoming more virulent with the rise of the French-oriented
Republicans led by Thomas Jefferson. Twisting the British lion's
tail in matters legal proved a popular vote-getting device in the
early nineteenth century, and alarmed conservatives feared the
successful subversion of all law and order.
"It is certainly true," wrote the Federalist lawyer Joseph
Hopkinson in 1809, "that very persevering efforts have been made,
for some years, in Pennsylvania, by some mistaken men, to bring
the Common Law into public odium and disuse." These assaults
upon the common law were "gradually ripening into a fatal action.
The moment seems to be approaching when the axe will be laid to
its root, and its spreading honours prostrated in death." Once the
"permanent rules" of Anglo-American jurisprudence were overthrown, Hopkinson anticipated an era of anarchy springing from
"the opinions, caprices and prejudices of judges and juries, who
"

*Department of History, Catholic University of America.
1 Quoted in J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (1956), p. 20.
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will deal out one measure of justice today and another tomorrow,
' 2
as humour, favour or affection may incline them.
Such dark forebodings bore little relation to the real strength
of legal radicalism in these early years. While local demagogues
might score an occasional victory over the "aristocrats" of the bar
and their Tory doctrines, widespread popular sentiment for overhauling the entire legal system was negligible. In part this reflected an absence of serious debate concerning the nature and
function of law in a democracy. Partisan politicians found it more
profitable to launch personal attacks against their opponents, creating much smoke with little fire. Their efforts led only to the passage
in several states of statutes modeled after a New Jersey law of
1799, which forbade members of the bar to cite in court any decision, opinion, or treatise regarding the common law written in
3
England after July 1, 1776.
The renewal of armed conflict with Great Britain in 1812 drove
all lesser disputes into the background and ended the first wave of
legal extremism in America. Thereafter reformers undertook a new
type of propaganda campaign. Promoted by liberal lawyers with
no political axes to grind, the Codification Movement of the 1820's
sought to awaken the general public to the incongruity between
democratic ideals and certain legal realities. For the first time
since the adoption of the Constitution, Americans found themselves
re-examining the methods and goals of the social order they had
created. Newspapers and magazines spread the debate to all parts
of the Union and it eventuated in a series of far-reaching legal reforms which stretched across the nineteenth century. A variety of
circumstances and individuals contributed to the outcome of the
codification effort, as in any large movement; but in its impact
upon popular opinion, it owed a peculiar debt to the tireless public
relations work of one man-the flamboyant Irish 6migr6 lawyer
William Sampson (1764-1836).4
2 Hopkinson, Considerations on the Abolition of the Common Law in
the United States (1809), p. 61.
3 Chroust, Rise of the Legal Professionin America (1965), v. 2, p. 54.
4 No adequate biography of Sampson has yet been written. He has
described his early career in the Memoirs of William Sampson (1817),
providing additional details in his introduction to the American edition
of William Henry Curran, The Life of the Right Honorable John Philpot
Curran, Late Master of the Rolls in Ireland (1820). For the important
American years one must rely principally upon a brief eulogistic sketch
prepared by his daughter, Mrs. William Tone, for Richard R. Madden,
The United Irishmen, Their Lives and Times (7 vols., 1842-46), vol. 2,
pp. 335-388. Sampson's achievements at the New York bar are entertainingly described in Browne, "William Sampson," 8 Green Bag 313 (1896).
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Sampson's career as a legal gadfly began somewhat paradoxically. Born at Londonderry into a family of Anglo-Irish clergymen
and landholders, he had every incentive to court favor from the
dominant Protestant Establishment. No political or social barriers
embittered his young manhood; when he enrolled as a student in
Dublin's Trinity College in the 1780's, he was following a path
already trod by his father, Reverend Arthur Sampson. And when
he later resolved to become a lawyer it seemed only natural to
travel to London like other sons of the aristocracy to "keep his
terms" at the famous Lincoln's Inn. On his return to Ireland in
1790 he was soon called to the Irish bar and began a promising
practice in Belfast, then a bustling seaport as well as the intellectual capital of the country.
Under normal conditions self-interest and a distaste for violent measures would probably have kept Sampson out of radical
politics; but the state of Ireland's internal affairs in the 1790's
was anything but normal. His debut as a lawyer coincided with an
impending crisis in his country's government. Reform measures in
such vital areas as land, suffrage, and religion were long overdue.
While the Irish Parliament had enjoyed complete control over
domestic policy-making since 1782, its membership was limited to
a narrow group of class-conscious oligarchs who, with few exceptions, resisted all efforts at political or social change. Nevertheless
change was in the air, especially among the intellectual circles of
Belfast, where a dominant Presbyterianism still enshrined the
republican spirit of the early covenanters. Nor were more recent
sources of inspiration lacking.
"The American revolution had reduced the theories of the
great philosophers of England, France, and other countries, into
practice," Sampson recalled in his Memoirs; "and persecutors be5
gan to find themselves surprised like owls overtaken by the day."
The American example, with its emphasis upon the natural rights
of all citizens, made a strong appeal to Irish liberals, an appeal
which was reinforced after 1789 by the more sensational uprising
against the old order taking place in France.
Irish sympathy for the Jacobin program found expression in
the pages of The Northern Star, a biweekly newspaper founded in
Belfast in January 1792 to spread reform ideas throughout Ireland.
Sampson was one of the chief contributors to the paper from its
beginnings to its final suppression by the government in 1797. 6 His
5 Memoirs of William Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 4, p. 311.
6 Richard R. Madden, The History of Irish Periodical Literature,
from the end of the 17th to the middle of the 19th century (2 vols., 1867),
vol. 2, pp. 225-235.
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burlesque articles attacked legal obscurantism as a major threat to
popular government among his countrymen.
In a widely read satire of 1794 (which was subsequently reprinted in the United States) Sampson ridiculed the harsh criminal
laws of the day which the average juror could not understand. He
envisaged a trial in which a hurdy-gurdy was charged with criminal
libel for daring to play the inflammatory "Ca Ira" along with its
other tunes. (The situation was not as whimsical as one might
think: the music of a hurdy-gurdy did form part of the evidence
used to convict one Thomas Muir of sedition during these years.)
Sampson had a field day deflating the pretentious formalities of
courtroom procedure. But he struck his most telling blows at the
partisanship of Irish judges, in whose hands an ambiguous law
could be transformed into a powerful bulwark of the ruling classes.
Where the law was oracular (as it too frequently proved to be) the
judge usurped the function of both juror and legislator. Trials
then became mere puppet shows, with jurors forbidden even to
reason about the facts, "but on the contrary they are to hear with
the law's ear, see with the law's eye, speak with the law's voice, of
'7
which law the court are alone to judge."
These apprehensions concerning judicial power (later to be
revived in a New World setting) stemmed from experience as well
as theory. During the years from 1790 to 1798 Sampson appeared
in court on numerous occasions to defend clients charged with
libel, sedition, and treason. His best efforts counted for little, however, in the face of increasingly repressive legislation and the
broad discretion vested in the bench over the conduct of causes
and the fixing of punishments. A sense of desperation drove him
at last into open rebellion against the government in the shortlived
insurrection of 1798.
"I never was inclined to political contention," he maintained,
"and it required strong conviction to move me to sedition. But there
are moments, when to be passive, is to be criminal; as when we
see a murder committed before our eyes, and do not stretch our
hand."8 Originally a proponent of moderate reforms, he came by
1798 to side with Wolfe Tone and the ultranational United Irishmen who demanded complete independence-a revolutionary rebirth
-as the only remedy for Ireland's ills. But their projected uprising
never got off the ground. In the early spring the government began
a systematic roundup of all known agitators, and soon most of
the rebel leaders found themselves behind bars.
.

P. 10.

Sampson, A Faithful Report of the Trial of Hurdy Gurdy (1807),

8 Memoirs of William Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 4, p. 311.
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Sampson, long distrusted for his criticisms of official policy,
was arrested on suspicion of being in the pay of the French Directory. He hotly denied the charge but never had the chance to disprove it in an open trial. Instead, British authorities arranged a
compromise by which all state prisoners were encouraged to secure
their freedom through voluntary exile to some European country
not then at war with England. Sampson chose Portugal and, after
many frustrating delays, reached Oporto in March 1799.
The next seven years (1799-1806) were filled with the uncertainty and danger characteristic of refugee life in any wartime
era. Sampson has left a colorful account of his wanderings across
the Continent in his Memoirs. While most of his experiences provide only raw material for the romancer, a lengthy sojourn in
France (June 1799-May 1805) was of crucial importance to his
later professional career.
As a warm supporter of the French Revolution, he was
prepared in advance to admire the new institutions reared upon
the ruins of the ancien r6gime. His exile gave him the opportunity
to observe at first hand the reconstruction of French society, particularly in the area of law, where the Code Napoleon supplanted the
divergent usages of local parlements after March 1804. A personal
acquaintance with certain French statesmen and jurists further
strengthened his appreciation of the merits of a code system, as
opposed to the uncertainties of judicial precedent. Long after his
removal to America these French influences would be revived for
him in a striking way, for according to his daughter's testimony:
"After the restoration of the Bourbons, several eminent French
emigrants, and amongst others Joseph Buonaparte, settled in
the United States; most of these united in choosing Mr. Sampson as their legal adviser; some of them had befriended him
when an exile, and he now more than repaid the obligation." 9
The British Government, with which Sampson had maintained
an acrimonious correspondence since the beginning of his exile, at
last granted him permission to emigrate to the United States in
May 1806. Soon after his arrival in New York he was admitted to
the local bar, which was strongly federalist and anti-revolutionary
in character. Building a practice in such an environment required
discretion, and Sampson generally avoided direct involvement in
partisan politics. He found it easier to remain detached, because
he believed that most political differences in America were minor
ones. Nevertheless by 1812 his Jeffersonian sympathies did lead him
to publish anonymously two small pamphlets defending Republican
9 Madden, op. cit. supra, note 4, p. 374.
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policy and lashing out at England's violations of international
maritime law.' 0
Such rare confessions of political faith counted for little beside
a growing interest in reforming the entire structure of American
law. This ambitious project came to seem more and more imperative as Sampson found himself re-engaged in the old struggle to
protect the civil liberties of his clients against the harsh demands
of English precedent. A string of dramatic criminal trials soon
established his reputation as a brilliant defense attorney, while
his skill in shorthand reporting enabled him to publish complete
accounts of the most interesting cases in which he took part." The
courtroom became his forum during the years from 1807 to 1822,
and he performed there with maximum effect in such celebrated
actions as the Case of the Journeymen Cordwainers of the City of
New York (1809).
This was one of the earliest important attempts to establish
the legality of the closed shop in America. A group of workers had
formed an association to improve their lot and sought to enforce
a demand for higher wages through strike activity. While no
American statute prohibited such conduct, it stood condemned as
an illegal conspiracy at common law. Should ,English doctrine on this
point control the decision of a New York judge? Sampson argued
convincingly that it should not.
The common law, he pointed out, had never been adopted in
full by the American colonies. Even Blackstone acknowledged that
the colonists took with them only those legal precepts and institutions suited to conditions in the New World. Now that independence
had been achieved, it was of vital importance to guard against any
foreign doctrines that might impair the growth of a democratic
society. English conspiracy statutes, directed against working class
organizations, had no place in a free America.
"We might as well prevent parents from conspiring to marry
their children, indict landlords for refusing to let their house at the
usual rents, or merchants from following the rates of the markets,"
Sampson declared. He attacked the class bias of English legislators
and judges, whose reactionary pronouncements were held in superstitious awe by American jurists. A blind adherence to common
30 Trial of Capt. Henry Whitby . . . also, the trial of Capt. George
Crimp (1812).
11 For an evaluation of ,Sampson's importance as a pioneer court
reporter, see Charles Currier Beale, "William Sampson," Proceedings of
the New York State Stenographers' Association at the Thirty-first
Annual Meeting, held at Albany August 23 and 24, 1906 (Albany, 1906),
20-42.
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law precedents could undermine the very ideals for which the
Revolution had been fought, as in a recent workmen's case in
Philadelphia where
".... his honor said it was improper to inquire whether or not
the application of the common law to our concerns would operate as an attack upon the rights of man. . . . But the constitution of this State is founded on the equal rights of men;
and whatever is an attack upon those rights is contrary to the
constitution. Whether it is, or is not, an attack upon the rights
of man, is, therefore, more fitting to be inquired into, than
whether or not it is conformable to the usages of Picts, Romans,
Britons, Danes, Jutes, Angles, Saxons, Normans, or other
barbarians, who lived in the night of human intelligence....
The more I reflect upon the advantages this nation has gained
by independence, the more I regret that one thing should still
2
be wanting to crown the noble arch-a NATIONAL CODE."'
Sampson's arguments failed to convince the court, which refused to consider the reasonableness of common law doctrines
adopted as the basis of New York jurisprudence by the framers of
the state constitution of 1777. Despite the local interest aroused by
his cases, he remained a minor critic of the law-indistinguishable
from other shadowy agitators in Ohio, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania
-until the publication of his Discourse on the Common Law in
1823.
This address, commissioned by the New York Historical
Society, contained the most sweeping indictment of common law
idealism ever written in America. By tracing legal thought back
to its origins in the customs of barbaric German tribes, Sampson
sought to dispel forever the myth that a golden age of English
jurisprudence had existed prior to the Norman Conquest. This was
no exercise in pedantry, for the "Saxon idols" still held a firm
place in American legal folklore. Even such a bitter opponent of
Blackstone and Mansfield as Thomas Jefferson professed a sentimental loyalty to the "pure" institutions and practices of the Saxon
era.' 3
But what relevance had the Saxon experience for nineteenthcentury America? They were mere savages, Sampson insisted, less
civilized than the Iroquois Indians of the New World. Of modern
commercial transactions they had no inkling; their criminal laws
12 The Case of the Journeymen Cordwainers of the City of NewYork, 1 Yates's Select Cases 142 (N. Y. 1811).
13 For Jefferson's ideas on legal history, see Waterman, "Thomas
Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 629 (1933).
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did not progress beyond the brutalities of the lex talionis; and there
was little evidence to suggest that they originated the jury system,
which they seldom employed in comparison with the trial by water
or red-hot ploughshares. Yet their primitive codes, with all their
deficiencies, proved more humane than the system imposed by their
Norman conquerors. It took centuries thereafter for judges to reestablish the rights of the individual citizen by resorting to a
series of awkward fictions which made the law unintelligible to the
average man.
Was it not high time to discard such mummery and pretense,
and place the law upon a rational and scientific footing? "The wellbeing of society requires that a subject of such vital importance
should be brought to the test of reason in the open light of day,"
Sampson urged. "Having adopted the common law of England, so
far as it is not repugnant to our constitutions, we have a mighty
interest to know clearly what it is, and from what stock it comes.
14
We must either be governed by laws made for us, or made by us."'
tradition
law
common
of
the
part
History demonstrated that no
deserved special veneration; rather every doctrine should be tested
by the principles of "natural reason, universal justice, and present
convenience." ' 15 In championing the cause of innovation, Sampson
appeared to be following a course marked out by earlier reformers;
but in fact a wide gap separated him from the Jeffersonian agitators
of the pre-1812 years.
The Jeffersonians had attacked the law as an instrument of
class domination in America. They sought to arouse the feelings of
backwoods "republicans" against a privileged establishment of
urban lawyers and judges, whose mastery of abstruse legal doctrines enabled them to promote the ends of a wealthy elite at the
expense of the democratic masses. Such partisan tactics proved most
effective in frontier areas such as Ohio or the western parts of
Pennsylvania, where the labels "Republican" and "Federalist" became interchangeable with "jacobin" and "aristocrat" in the
popular mind. 16
14Sampson's Discourse, and Correspondence with Various Learned
Jurists,upon the History of the Law (1826), p. 32.
15 Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 14.
16 William T. Utter, "Saint Tammany in Ohio: A Study in Frontier
Politics," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 15 (Dec. 1928), 321340; Utter, "Ohio and the English Common Law," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, vol. 16 (Dec. 1929) 321-333; Surrency, "When the
Common Law Was Unpopular in Pennsylvania," 33 Pennsylvania
B. A. Q. 291 (1962); ,Chroust, "The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in
the Post-Revolutionary Era," 35 Notre Dame Law. 48 (1959).
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But it was precisely this element of class antagonism which
Sampson and his adherents rejected in the 1820's. They worked for
reform within the legal profession, looking to the scholar rather
than the demagogue to carry through their program. Sampson
thought of himself as a latter-day Luther, called to purge the law
of its superstitious and irrational features so that it might be reestablished on a basis of sound principles intelligible to the average
man. Far from desiring to uproot accepted doctrines recklessly, he
conceded "that the English reports contain, amidst a world of rubbish, rich treasures of experience, and that those of our own courts,
contain materials of inestimable worth, and require little more
than regulation and systematic order."'17 The task of culling useful
precepts from a mass of conflicting court decisions could only be
entrusted to the legislature, however, because judges were disinclined by temperament and training to challenge past authorities.
Sampson pictured the judiciary as slaves of precedent. Whenever a case arose, the doctrine of stare decisis required that a judge
suspend his own views and seek instead to fit the facts into some
line of previously reported opinions. Since these opinions were both
voluminous and at variance with one another, a litigant had no
way to predict the outcome of his case. Even where the circumstances proved unique, and a judge found himself compelled to
render a verdict on the basis of his own beliefs, one litigant fell
victim to the announcement of every new rule.
Judicial policy-making, by its very nature, could lead only to
arbitrary and highly personal results, yet Sampson was careful to
avoid imputing any sinister or undemocratic motives to the judges
themselves. It was the system that was at fault, he insisted, a system adapted to the needs of a society in which the masses could
neither read nor write and had therefore to rely upon the haphazard
decisions of the bench to determine their lawful rights. But in
America, where popular education was the rule, each citizen had an
obligation to study and comprehend the law for himself. A legislative code modeled upon the Code Napoleon would provide comprehensive guidelines for both lawyers and laymen, and would insure
popular control over any future changes of policy.
To reduce the amorphous bulk of the law to a system of scientific axioms would prove an immense undertaking, of course, but
the first steps in the process had long been taken. Most states
periodically revised and digested their written statutes; why not
complete the picture by systematizing court decisions as well? The
times were uniquely favorable for such an experiment. While European nations still suffered from wars and domestic tyranny, the
17

Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 14, p. 38.
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United States had entered upon an era of unprecedented peace and
prosperity, in which the fierce party feuds of the Jeffersonian years
seemed buried forever. Citizens of all political faiths could now
unite behind the labors of enlightened jurists who should reform
18
the law with a "tender, patient, kindly, and experienced hand."
Sampson's Discourse was widely reported in the newspaper and
periodical press of the time, and created a storm of controversy
among reviewers. While no purely legal journals existed in America
in 1824, lawyers contributed extensively to more general publications, which always contained a healthy smattering of articles
dealing with current trends and problems in the law. Henry D.
Sedgwick, writing for Boston's influential North American Review,
praised Sampson's bold attack upon judicial servility to "precedents
not consonant to the spirit of the age" and urged that "at least some
of the larger and more wealthy states of the Union should cause
their laws to pass under a general revision, and to be formed into
written codes." Conservative reviewers in Philadelphia and New
York, on the other hand, denounced the Discourse as shallow satire
and suggested that any visionary tampering with the law would
19
destroy one of the strongest bonds of union between the states.
Sampmounted,
question
As popular interest in the codification
son began a new publicity campaign designed to point up the practical advantages of the scheme. For two years (1824-1826) he
maintained an active correspondence with politicians and jurists
throughout the Union, spreading his ideas through local newspapers
and national magazines. 20 The cream of this correspondence reappeared in book form in 1826, by which time legal reform had beand a
come a commonplace topic of discussion in literary journals
21
source of increasing comment among foreign observers.
IsSampson, op. cit. supra, note 14, p. 36.
19 Henry D. Sedgwick, "The Common Law," North American Review,

vol. 19 (Oct. 1824) 427, 430; "The Common Law," Port Folio, vol. 17
(Apr. 1824), 296-299; "The Common Law," Atlantic Magazine, vol. 1
(May 1824) 23-30; "On the Substitution of a Written Code, in the place
of the Common Law," Atlantic Magazine, vol. 1 (Aug. 1824) 283-298.

20 Sampson's principal American correspondents included: Thomas
Cooper and Gov. John L. Wilson (S. C.); Charles Watts (La.); Sen.

Isham Talbot (Ky.); and George M. Bibb (Wash., D.C.). The debate over

codification may be traced through such varied publications as: New
York American; National Intelligencer (Wash., D. C.); New York
Evening Post; Charleston Mercury; National Advocate (N. Y.); North
American Review; Atlantic Magazine; and United States Law Journal.
21 See, for example, C. S. Daveis, "Common Law Jurisdiction,"
North American Review, vol. 21 (July 1825) 104-141; "Verplanck's Essay

on Contracts," New York Review and Atheneum Magazine, vol. 2 (Jan.
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Sampson and his supporters were ardent Francophiles who
looked to the Code Napoleon as a model for American legislators.
In their eyes, the French experience demonstrated the limits of
improvement possible under a code system. While no set of general
principles could answer all human problems, the wisest precedents
of the past could be summarized in definitive fashion as a guide to
the future. Then, noted the South Carolinian jurist Thomas
Cooper, "the labor of reading and of citing the cases which form
the basis of the principles enacted . . . will have been taken away,
and if much labor still remains, much has been saved." Far from
acting as a deterrent to further social change, every code would be
revised from time to time to incorporate new rights and remedies.
"But is it nothing," Cooper argued, "that we have, or can have if
we please, a new starting place every half century, leaving behind
us the accumulated rubbish of years' proceedings?"22
Such labor-saving considerations had special meaning for
practicing lawyers in the 1820's, who found themselves confronted
with an ever-increasing mass of reported decisions. In 1824 Caleb
Cushing noted that the number of volumes of American reports
alone had leaped from eight to 198 during the previous twenty
years.2 3 Codification provided at least one answer to the rising cost
of a lawyer's library, as well as the major delays he encountered in
preparing and pleading a case.
But the general public would reap the greatest benefits under
a code system, for the law would cease to be a mysterious science
beyond the ken of the masses. Once reduced to fixed moral principles, its methods and objectives could be appreciated by the average
layman, who would find the printed code an indispensable textbook
of social ethics. A wiser and more responsible citizenry had already
1826) 106-125; Henry D. Sedgwick, "Correspondence on the History of
the Law," North American Review, vol. 23 (July 1826) 197-201; "Reviews" (Sampson's Discourse and Report from New York Commissioner8), United States Literary Gazette, vol. 4 (Aug. 1826), 345-348;
"Apergu de la Situation Int~rieure des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et de
leurs Rapports Politiques avec l'Europe. Par un Russe," Monthly Review
(London), III n.s. (Sept. 1826), 45-59; Bonnecase, La Thgmis (18191881): Son Fondateur,Athanase Jourdan158 (2d ed. 1914). The codification controversy also furnished material for several lively satires, including the novella "The Perfection of Reason" in James K. Paulding, The
Merry Tales of the Three Wise Men of Gotham (rev. ed., 1839), pp.
105-169; and "Letter of Levinz Comberbach," New York Review and
Atheneum Magazine, vol. 2 (Feb. 1826) 213-216.
22 Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 14, p. 53.
23 Caleb Cushing, "Law Reports," North American Review, vol. 18
(Apr. 1824) 377.
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developed in France following the enactment of the Code Napoleon,
while in Louisiana, where a civil code had recently gone into effect,
the transplknted New York attorney Charles Watts observed: "The
planters and well informed men have the code in their hand, and
discuss it as a branch of politics; while, on the contrary, the community here (in New York) are involved in Egyptian dark"24
ness .
If laymen were to play a more meaningful role in legal deliberations, however, that did not imply the destruction of the professional
bar. The codifiers compared the law to a skilled trade whose practitioners required specialized talents and training. Could every
man be his own cobbler? they asked. Obviously not. Yet the principles of shoemaking were known to all, and a customer could readily
detect the difference between a good pair of shoes and those of inferior quality. So it would be with the law: a thorough grounding
in basic principles would enable the average man to exercise a
healthy check upon legal fraud and mysticism, as the Reformation
had established popular control of religion without lessening the
need for trained ministers. Codes could never produce a lawyerless
utopia, for litigation was rooted in the selfish nature of man. But
the caliber of the bar would be immensely improved under a code
system which would eliminate the uncertain precedents and archaic
technicalities that played into the hands of the shyster class of
common law pleaders.
In emphasizing the limited aims of their reform program,
Sampson and his colleagues were seeking to dissociate themselves
from the radicalism of Jeremy Bentham, the English proponent of
codes whose propagandist labors for more than thirty years had
made his name synonymous with the codification cause in both
Europe and America. Bentham was an eccentric reformer who cherished a rather personal hatred of the English judiciary and of what
he regarded as the sentimentality of the natural rights school of
jurisprudence. In his view a citizen could claim only such rights as
were guaranteed to him by positive legislation. To speak of imaginary states of nature conferring inalienable liberties upon the individual was absurdly romantic. Personal freedom could not exist
without specific governmental sanctions. Only a code of laws defining
in detail the scope of individual action could protect the average
25
man from designing politicians and judges.
Bentham looked upon such written codes as the sole determinant
Sampson, op. cit. supra., note 14, p. 87.
Paul A. Palmer, "Benthamism in England and America," 35 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 855 (1941).
24

25
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of rights and duties within a state. They were to cover every
conceivable problem that might arise among men, embodying solutions in the form of general principles that all men might grasp.
An eighteenth-century faith in the inherent rationality of mankind
led Bentham to insist also that each article of a code be followed
by an explanatory justification, so that citizens might not only
know what the law was, but why it had been framed. On this account he sharply criticized the Code Napoleon, alleging that if the
true nature of many of its provisions had been revealed to the
French people, they would have rebelled against the Corsican's
26
arbitrary rule.
The American codifiers, on the other hand, considered the
brevity of the French code one of its prime attractions. Nor were
they ready to abandon the natural law philosophy of John Locke
which had inspired the revolutionists of 1776 and now held sway over
their sons. Lockean intellectual tradition and French legislative
practice formed the twin foundations upon which Sampson and his
adherents proposed to erect their codes, which should not supplant
pre-existing rights but rather supplement and strengthen them.
The opponents of codification, deprived of a favorite whippingboy in Benthamite radicalism, turned their full energies toward
discrediting the Code Napoleon. "What kind of legislation is this
for all the various and multiform concerns of a whole community?"
demanded a writer in the Charleston Mercury of July 28, 1825.27
The French experience only demonstrated the futility of trying to
compress human behavior into rigid categories. Without a plethora
of judicial interpretations the stifling restraints of the code would
long since have acted to check economic and social progress in
France. As it was, critics charged that many articles were being
superseded by court decisions and that in twenty or thirty years
such judicial glosses would constitute the sole source of authority
28
for Frenchmen.
To counter these attacks, which struck at the heart of his
program, Sampson appealed directly to one of the most distinguished
practicing lawyers of France, Andr6 Dupin, for a first-hand account
of legal conditions in his country. Dupin's reply, which was published in both the United States and England, supplied an indispensable link in the codification argument.
26 Bentham, Supplement to Papers Relative to Codification and
Public Instruction (1817), p. 126. See also Chilton 'Williamson, "Bentham
Looks at America," 70 Pol. Sci. Q. 543 (1955).
27 Sampson, op. cit. supra, note 14, p. 59.
28 "On the Substitution of a Written Code, in the Place of the Common Law," op. cit. supra, note 19, pp. 287, 295.
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After rehearsing the advantages which France derived from
abolishing divergent customs in favor of a uniform national code,
Dupin observed:
"It is not true, sir, that the authority of precedents has at all
prevailed against the text of our codes, nor that we are threatened, in the most distant manner, with the disappearance of the
letter of the law under the heap of interpretations. In every discussion, the text of the law is first resorted to, and if the law
speaks, then non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est. If the
law has not clearly decided on the particular case under discussion, doubtless, it being silent or deficient, the defect is supplied
by the judges; but where is the system in which the judgments
''
have not necessarily furnished the complement of legislation."
Judicial construction of doubtful statutes remained a far cry
from judicial control of policy-making, such as existed in common
law countries, where the bench regulated the tempo and nature of
legal change through "the exercise of arbitrary power."80
Dupin confined his remarks to the French codes, voicing only a
hesitant faith in America's readiness for a similar experiment. But
from another Frenchman, Count Pierre Frangois Ral, came enthusiastic support for Sampson's labors, coupled with some practical suggestions for setting up and working with a code commission.
Ral was uniquely qualified to offer such advice. As a jurist and
personal friend of Napoleon, he had played a major role in drafting
the French codes. His unshakeable loyalty to the Emperor, whom he
served as prefect of police during the Hundred Days, caused him to
be banished from France in 1815 by the restored government of
Louis XVIII. Thereafter he emigrated to America and settled in
upstate New York, from which refuge he wrote to Sampson in 1824,
urging
"Do as we did, but do it better, profiting by our mistakes. Let
four or five good heads be united in a commission, to frame in
silence the project of a code. It is not so difficult a task. It is
only to consult together, and to select . . . what is best from
your best authors. You have ample materials. We had Pothier
always in our hands, and above all his Treatise on Obligations.
We compared and weighed; we tried to settle what was in doubt,
and fix what was uncertain, and were often guided by his solutions, which we did little more than reduce into articles ...
29 "Letter on the Napoleon Code," United States Review and Literary
Gazette, I (Nov. 1826), 127.
30 "Letter on the Napoleon Code," op. cit. supra, note 29, p. 128.
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As long as nothing is written, nothing will be done; but you
gain something the moment that you have a written text for the
groundwork of your discussions, how imperfect soever it may be
at first. Our code was far from being adopted, as it was originally proposed in the entire. I doubt whether one hundred articles were preserved in the form in which they were presented.
It will require ardent hearts, and cool heads, and resolved industry, for such a work. With these, I think, you will not fail
of complete success."'
With the publication of his Correspondence with Various
Learned Jurists in 1826, Sampson abandoned his propagandist activity. He had reached the age of sixty-two and his health, never
very robust, began to decline perceptibly until his death a decade
later. While he continued to practice law on occasion into the early
1830's, he resisted all temptation to re-engage in controversial
public debate of any kind. "In late years," wrote his friend William
Macneven in January, 1837, "his habits were so retired, and his
occupations so domestic, that his name seldom came before the
public, and his society was only enjoyed by a small circle of intimate
friends."32
Sampson's retirement involved no desertion of his fellow reformers, for he had already accomplished his objectives. He never
aspired to draft a code himself, being content to arouse the general
public's interest in such an innovation. And who could deny that the
public was interested by 1826? In Louisiana a civil code and a code
of practice had been adopted by the legislature the previous year;
New York had commissioned three lawyers to review the inadequacies of her existing statutes as a possible first step in the direction of a general code; significant codification movements were afoot
in Pennsylvania and South Carolina; the American bar in general
was sharply divided over the issue, with influential spokesmen arrayed on either side; and Sampson's arguments were even being
reprinted and studied in England, where they offered encouragement to a rising band of English legal reformers. Codification appeared to be the wave of the future to many informed commentators, such as William H. Gardiner of the Massachusetts bar, who
predicted to readers of the North American Review in January,
1827: "Codes are to be proposed, discussed, assailed, defended,
31 Sampson, op. cit. supra., note 14, pp. 66, 191. A brief but colorful
account of Real may be found in Clarence Edward Macartney and Gordon Dorrance, The Bonapartes in America (1939), pp. 123-124.
32 Quoted in Madden, The United Irishmen, op. cit. supra, note 4,
p. 387.
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throughout the union; and we look to see the day, when codifiers
and anticodifiers will wage a war as fierce and interminable, as that
which raged of yore between the Doctors of Admiralty and his
33
Majesty's servants of King's Bench."
Within a decade, however, the energies of the codification party
were either neutralized or diverted to other ends by the advent of
Jacksonian Democracy. The most influential legal reformers of the
1830's, such as Robert Rantoul, resurrected the old shibboleths of
monopoly and class privilege, damning not only the common law
but the common lawyer as well. Popular distrust of the expert during the Jackson years militated against the success of any scheme
to employ salaried professionals to reconstruct the content of the
law.34 Yet the undemocratic features of the existing system seemed
to cry all the more urgently for correction.
The Jacksonians resolved their dilemma by extending the spoils
system from politics to jurisprudence. Instead of attempting to reshape abstract legal doctrines, they concentrated on getting the right
sort of men into judicial posts. Mississippi led the way through a
provision in her new Constitution of 1832 that all judges should be
elected to office for short terms. Soon a majority of states followed
her example, abandoning the older practice by which judges were
5
appointed to the bench for life.3

Along with this assault upon the judiciary went a vigorous
drive to "democratize" the bar by opening legal practice to all
comers. Jacksonian orators asserted that every man had a natural
83

W. H. Gardiner, "Revision of the Laws of New York," North

American Review, vol. 24 (Jan. 1827) 194; Sampson, op. cit. supra,

note 14, pp. 74, 103, 159; "Codification of the Laws of the United
States of America," 2 Jurist (London) 47 (1828). In Louisiana, stronghold of French legal thought, code commissioners had been appointed as
early as 1821. Here Sampson's publicity campaign tended to provoke a
vigorous anti-code reaction by 1826. See Sampson, op. cit. supra., note 14,
p. 162. The most famous Louisiana codifier, Edward Livingston, was an
avowed Benthamite; significantly his Criminal Code, which sought to
approximate Bentham's standards, was not adopted by the Louisiana
legislature, while a Civil Code and Code of Practice, based upon French
models, went into effect in 1825. Smith, "Edward Livingston and the
Louisiana Codes," 2 Columbia L. Rev. 24 (1902).
34 A good example of Rantoul's polemics may be found in his "Oration at Scituate" (1836), reprinted in Memoirs, Speeches, and Writings

of Robert Rantoul, Jr., ed. Luther Hamilton (1854), pp. 251-296. See also
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (1950), pp. 322-333; and
Chroust, Rise of the Legal Profession (1965), vol. 2, pp. 59, 69.
35 Blackard, "The Demoralization of the Legal 'Profession in Nineteenth Century America," 16 Tenn. L. Rev. 318 (1940).
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right to follow any business, profession or calling. Pursuant to
this theory state legislatures passed laws in the 1830's and 1840's
which abolished all qualifying tests for admission to the bar and
made every man in truth his own lawyer.
Massachusetts set the example in an act passed in 1836 which
declared that if a man was of good moral character and had read
law for three years in an attorney's office, he was automatically
entitled to practice before the state courts. Other states-including
New Hampshire (1842), Maine (1843), Georgia (1847), Wisconsin
(1849), and Indiana (1851)-eliminated even the clerkship requirement and recognized every "citizen" or "resident" as a bona
36
fide lawyer.
The layman also wielded new power as a juror during these
years. In many jurisdictions judges were forbidden to comment on
the evidence during a trial or even to charge the jury except in
terms proposed by counsel. Lawsuits became more than ever tests
of forensic skill, with judges reduced to the status of passive spectators and jurors weighing the evidence with little guidance out37
side of their own intuitions.
In such an egalitarian atmosphere the professionalism of the
old-style codifiers was foredoomed to defeat. Yet their program suffered also from internal contradictions which no overall assessment
can fail to acknowledge. Logically Sampson and his colleagues fell
between two stools. They preached emancipation from English legal
tutelage in the name of a militant nationalism, while clinging to an
eighteenth-century faith in the efficacy of unvarying moral principles. To extol the uniqueness of American conditions was one
thing; to bury national peculiarities within general formulae was
something else again. For code provisions, once formulated, tended
to represent absolute values, largely independent of time and space.
And in challenging the common law tradition reformers encountered
a line of defense much better attuned to the romantic xenophobia
of the age.
Champions of the judiciary argued convincingly that court decisions mirrored the changing mores of a people more faithfully
than uniform laws, which took account only of extreme variations
in popular attitudes or behavior. Litigation, on the other hand,
served as an accurate barometer to measure the slightest fluctuations in the national character. As customs altered within a state,
the common law, grounded upon the collective experience of the
36 Blackard, op. cit. supra, pp. 314-316.
37 Griswold, Law and Lawyers in the United States (2d ed. 1965),
p. 19.
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citizen body, altered in turn.38 Such considerations appealed to the
jingoism of post-1812 America; coupled with the fact that most
state legislatures in the 1820's and 1830's were still dominated by
lawyers trained in the black-letter school, they posed a formidable
barrier to the ultimate success of any program of general
codification.
Yet if the codifiers had lost their major battle by the mid1830's, in one important respect they won the war. Sampson's strictures against the technicalities of common law pleading and the
hoary fictions of Anglo-American property law set in motion a
chain of limited reforms which vitally altered the shape of American jurisprudence by the end of the century. As a direct result of
his labors, the New York legislature passed a statute in 1828 which
revolutionized the real property law of the state, forming in effect
39
a partial code.
Other states in turn began to explore the possibilities of systematizing certain branches of their law by taking into account not
only prior statutes, but related judicial decisions as well. The new
trend assumed major proportions after 1848, when New York abolished the intricate common law rules of pleading and practice in a
Code of Civil Procedure which was soon adopted by twenty-three
other states and territories. 4 0
Under the guise of legislative revision the codification movement achieved respectability and Sampson and his adherents slipped
into the mainstream of the American reform tradition. "A few
years ago," declared the influential American Jurist in April, 1835
"... codification had a direful import to the conservative party
in jurisprudence; and not wholly without reason; since some
of its early champions were sturdy radicals in legal reform. In
this view codification was another name for juridical revolution.... But the alarm has subdued ... and the doctrine seems
to be now acquiesced in, by a general consent, that a code must
be more a digest and arrangement of existing laws, than a
body of new enactments made per saltum.... The substitution
of the terms revision and consolidation of statutes, for that of
codification, has contributed, in no small degree, to the change
of thinking on this subject ....-41
38 N. Haven, "English Common Law Reports," North American
Review, vol. 21 (Oct. 1825) 377-388; N. Haven "On the Substitution of a
Written Code, in the Place of the Common Law," North American Review, vol. 21 (Oct. 1825) 288-292, 295.
39 Warren, A History of the American Bar (1911), p. 525.
40 Warren, op. cit. supra, note 39, pp. 528-539.
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Partial codification thus emerged as the answer of the professional bar to the mounting clamor for changes in the law after
1828. As laymen struggled to democratize the bench, lawyers worked
to re-establish confidence in judicial integrity by eliminating the
most glaring anachronisms of common law doctrine. Out of the ferment of these years developed a continuing reform impulse which
restructured American law in significant ways through the rest of
the century. The process was gradual and piecemeal, but it did establish a more realistic balance between legal traditionalism and the
expanding needs of a modern democracy. And though many important problems remained untouched by 1900, those at least which
were earmarked for correction by the debates of the 1820's had
received in the interim a sound and enduring settlement at the
hands of common law lawyers and judges.

